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Dividend Policy of Indonesian Listed Firms: The Role of Families and the State 
 
Abstract 
We investigate factors influencing the dividend policy of the listed Indonesian firms by focusing on 
agency costs and ownership structure. Our study finds that firms with higher conflicts of interest 
among managers and shareholders pay lower dividends. In the context of the conflicts of interest 
among major and minor shareholders, we find that such conflicts would exert little impact on 
dividend payments. Further, we find that the family-controlled firms prefer to pay less dividends 
whereas the corporations with higher state ownership are associated with larger dividend payments. 
Our findings are in line with the argument that the Indonesian state consider corporate dividends as 
one of the main sources of revenues other than corporate taxes in their government budget. This 
issue may have adverse effects on the growth of cash-constrained small and medium-sized 
enterprises. 
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1. Introduction  
For more than half a century, how managers make decisions on corporate dividend policies has been 
a mystery and there are some questions remains still unanswered regarding the economic rationale 
behind paying dividends (Rozeff, 1982; Baker et al., 2002). Scholars have relentlessly investigated 
dividend policy from different perspectives. These efforts are  intended to seek out potential answers 
to a firm’s motivations for paying dividends. With regard to the above statements, this  study 
attempts to investigate the extent to which firms make decisions concerning dividend policy in the 
context of agency problems by focusing on an emerging market, Indonesia. As argued by La Porta 
et al. (2000b), such conflicts may occur between corporate insiders, such as managers and 
controlling shareholders, and outside investors such as minority shareholders.  
Over the course of the last few decades, a large and growing body of literature has 
highlighted the agency theory from another perspective: the conflict of interest between the 
controlling and minority shareholders. Such conflicts have been reported to commonly occur in 
firms with concentrated ownership structure (see e.g., Claessens et al., 1999; La Porta et al., 2000a; 
Faccio et al., 2001). When the ownership structure is concentrated in the hands of a few dominant 
shareholders, these controlling shareholders can use their power to not only effectively control and 
monitor managers, but also expropriate minority shareholders if the protection afforded to the 
minority is too weak (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). From this perspective, one can contend that when 
large shareholders gain almost complete control of the firm, they prefer to generate private benefits 
at the expense of the minority shareholders.  
Some studies reveal that dividends can help protect the minority shareholders (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 2000a). Mancinelli and Ozkan (2006) argue that the effectiveness of 
the role of dividends in reducing agency costs may depend on a company’s ownership and control 
structure. Fairchild et al. (2014), based on Thai listed companies, reveal that increasing investor 
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power via high ownership concentration is associated with higher dividend payments. Similarly, 
Renneboog and Szilagyi (2015) find that the controlling shareholders of Dutch firms actually 
demand higher dividends, suggesting that the presence of controlling shareholders and dividends 
complement each other in the reduction of agency problems. A recent international study by Tran 
et al. (2017) examines the relationships among dividend policy, shareholder rights and creditor 
rights. They find that expropriation issues have become more salient after the global financial crisis. 
Al-Malkawi et al. (2014) examine the dividend decisions of Omani firms and state that Oman is a 
unique case for investors and policy makers. Similarly, Indonesia has unique characteristics such as 
high ownership concentration, the influence of the state, politically connectedness of businesses  
and  regulations regarding dividend policy. However, very few studies investigate how managers of 
the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) firms make dividend decisions in this environment.  
One of the novelties in this study is that we examine agency conflicts in terms of two 
perspectives: the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, and those between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, which has been neglected by the extant 
literature. In doing so, we employ various proxies to quantify such conflicts. Our study highlights 
two main research questions: i) to what extent do agency conflicts influence dividend policy of 
Indonesian firms, and ii) does corporate ownership structure matter in setting dividend policy of 
Indonesian listed firms? These questions are important because their answers can raise issues related 
to the ownership structure (especially family and state ownership) and functioning of corporate 
governance practices of corporations in Indonesia, which is a very large emerging economy with 
unique characteristics. In other terms, inappropriate corporate ownership mix and inefficient 
corporate governance mechanisms may originate from strong relationship between politics and 
business, dominant family membership to control management and board of commissioners, and 
the role of government to appoint or replace directors of SOEs. Such sub-optimal practices would 
have adverse consequences on the corporate sector and the macroeconomic indicators in Indonesia. 
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Therefore, by examining firms operating in a different environment, when compared to the firms in 
developed markets, this study can extend our understanding on how corporate payout policies are 
determined in different contexts. 
The ownership structure of firms listed on the IDX as documented by Claessens and Fan 
(2002), is characterised by a high level of concentration, whereby two-thirds of firms are dominated 
by a single controlling shareholder. Equity stock is concentrated in hands of a few families and 
corporations and the State. In another study, Claessens et al. (1999) document that Indonesia has 
the greatest ownership concentration in East Asia, together with Thailand and Hong Kong, and that 
family shareholders are the main controllers of  most of the firms listed in the IDX. Similarly, 
Husnan (2001) finds that top 15 families control 61.7 percent of market capitalization in Indonesian 
listed firms. Moreover, Sawicki (2009) documents that Indonesian listed firms had the highest 
ownership concentration and the lowest payout ratio during the post-crisis period of 1999-2003 as 
well as the second lowest ratio during the crisis period of 1997-1998. Similarly, La Porta et al. 
(1999) and Claessens and Fan (2002) have indeed identified that IDX firms have (i) high levels of 
ownership concentration, (ii) predominant family control, and (iii) low protective regulation for 
minority shareholders.   
The ownership structure of firms on the IDX has not changed substantially and such 
shareholders are still dominant in these firms due to the absence of regulations that limit the stock 
ownership of particular shareholders.1 For instance, we find that in 17% of our sample firms the   
largest shareholder holds between 30% and 40% of the stocks of their firm in 2013. Furthermore, 
Faccio et al. (2001) document that the Asian value system is characterised by the dominance of 
                                                          
1 In 2014, the Financial Service Authority, the security exchange commission governing Indonesian capital market,   
released new regulations obliging listed firms to increase shareholding for non-controller and non-primary shareholders 
to at least 7.5% of the paid capital. This means that the number of shares held by public shareholders is at least 7.5%. 
The regulations also require that the minimum number of shareholders is 300 persons. However, the regulations do not 
explicitly limit the maximum percentage of shareholding by the controlling or primary shareholders. Only in the banking 
sectors is the limit to shareholdings explicitly regulated; that is, financial institutions, non-financial institutions, and 
individuals have the cap of maximum 40%, 30%, and 20%, respectively. 
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family loyalties, which tends to foster crony capitalism. By examining the typical ownership 
formation of Indonesian firms, this study follows Faccio et al.’s (2001) study by suggesting that this 
issue should be approached in terms of a majority-minority problem as well as the principal-agent 
conflicts of interest. 
The number of dividend policy studies focusing on the Indonesian context is limited. The 
existing Indonesian studies are based on surveys (see e.g., Ang et al., 1997; Kester et al., 1998; 
Baker and Powell, 2012). Denis and Osobov’s (2008) study examining dividend policy in 33 
developing countries included only one Indonesian firm in their sample. Atmaja (2016) examines 
the relationship between family-controlled firms and dividend policy in Indonesia, finding that 
family control has a significantly negative impact on dividend payouts. This correlation is also found 
in the study by Setiawan et al. (2016), who also confirm that state- and foreign-controlled firms 
have a positive effect on dividend policy. Ratnadi et al. (2013) examine corporate dividend policy 
in Indonesia by focusing on accounting conservatism. Our study investigates issues that have not 
been addressed by previous studies, particularly in using Indonesian data to examine the association 
between various ownership structure and dividend policy. These issues are concerned with whether 
the main owner, or the largest shareholder, plays a significant role in terms of influencing managers’ 
dividend decisions, and whether firms dominated by different types of owners display different 
behaviours in determining dividend policy. Therefore, this paper distinguishes itself from the 
previous studies by focusing on: (i) the ownership structure data, which are categorized into family, 
state ownership, and foreign investors (ii) the presence of second largest shareholders, which has 
been neglected by previous studies in determining dividend policy; (iii) the role of corporate 
governance mechanisms on dividend policy; and (iv) the method of analysis by which we apply the 
probit method and the marginal effects to analyse the propensity of paying dividend as well as the 
Heckman two-step specification to consider sample selection bias with regards to the intensity of 
paying dividends.  
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Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world and has the sixteenth largest 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with the economic growth rate of 5.6% in 2013 (World Bank, 2014). 
Indonesia experienced a high growth of new stock listing after merging the Jakarta and the Surabaya 
stock exchanges into the IDX in 2007 (see Baker and Powell, 2012). By 2014, IDX had recorded a 
total market value of Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) 4,476,046 million2 ($373 billion), with $499 million 
in daily transactions, making Indonesia the second largest capital market in Southeast Asia. 
Moreover, the IDX management has set the ambitious target of overtaking Singapore’s first position 
in the ranking by 2015.3 However, the IDX authority has not allowed foreign corporations to be 
listed in Indonesia. Consequently, this policy has the potential to hinder the acceleration of growth 
of the IDX in comparison to Singapore and Malaysia, which allows foreign corporations onto their 
stock exchanges.4 As for another economic policy making debate, the Indonesian government sets 
a specific amount of dividend that must be paid by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for a given year, 
and that dividends become one of the key sources  of revenues for the state. In addition, SOEs have 
roles as agents of profits and agents of development in the sense that they bring social mission to 
provide financial and managerial aids to help micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises to 
develop their businesses. The multitasking role contributed by SOEs may have impact on firms’ 
strategic decisions such as corporate dividend policy. This suggests that SOEs face a trade-off 
between two roles: they must pursue target dividends to fulfil the government’s demand and at the 
same time they are expected to provide social missions with appropriate economic activities. A 
similar reasoning is provided by the extant literature as they highlight the importance of efficient 
corporate sectors and well-functioning financial markets that would have direct implications on 
                                                          
2 In January 2014, the average exchange rate was IDR10,223.16/USD (Source: Central Bank of Indonesia). 
3 See http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/02/13/idx-unveils-ways-be-se-asia-s-largest-stock-market.html  
4 In addition, government regulation has imposed a stock exchange-related tax that is higher compared to those countries. 
For instance, Indonesia imposed a 15% tax on dividends, while capital gain is treated as ordinary taxable income. The 
sale of shares of publicly listed firms in IDX is subject to a tax of 0.1% of the transaction value, while no equivalent tax 
for capital gains has been imposed in Singapore and Malaysia. See also Geiler and Renneboog (2015), who study the 
relevance of tax regulations to payout policies in the U.K.  Currently, the Indonesian government is considering reducing 
tax rates (even abolishing) on dividends in an attempt to transform their saving society into an investing society. 
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economic growth (see e.g., Mallick and Yang, 2011; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Love and Zicchino, 
2006). 
Ang et al. (1997) identify the uniqueness of Indonesian firms in terms of organizational forms 
and business practices, while Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) contend that Indonesia has a unique 
financial environment, in which political connections have significant effects on the financing 
patterns of firms. In addition, Fu et al. (2015) argue that politically connected firms frequently obtain 
preferential treatment from banks regarding lending, particularly from state-owned banks. 
Moreover, their study also finds that informal political connections play a more important role in 
improving firms’ access to finance than formal connections.  
The distinctiveness of dividend policy among listed Indonesian firms can be considered from 
two points of view. Firstly, as identified by Goyal and Muckley (2013), Asian firms listed in 
countries such as Indonesia that adopt mainly civil law codes have poor investor protection and have 
the tendency to pay low dividends.5 Secondly, the dividend policy of Indonesian firms depends on 
the explicit discretions made by management as disclosed in their annual reports. For instance, firms 
set the minimum fund reserves on a yearly basis or set cash dividend payments at a given maximum 
percentage of net earnings. Such restrictions would have direct effects on the amount of dividends 
paid by the firms, which are related to the implementation of the firms’ compliance of the Company 
Act passed in 2007.6 These policy changes may have implications for all shareholders. For majority 
shareholders who have control over company managers, these policies give potential benefits such 
as retaining the earnings, which may be used to repurchase stocks in order to enable them to increase 
                                                          
5 Consistent with their findings, our study notes that the highest dividend per share paid by the Indonesian listed firms 
in 2013 was IDR817, which is equivalent to $0.08, with an average of IDR28.3 or $0.003. Moreover, due to the 
instability/depreciation of the exchange rate between the IDR and hard currencies, the real value of dividends will 
potentially lessen. This should raise an interesting question as to why international investors are interested in investing 
in IDX firms, as we find that foreign investors hold over 19% of shares in this country. 
6 Based on the article #70 of the Act, if firms realize a positive balance of profit in a financial year, then it is compulsory 
for them to set aside a certain amount of their earnings as a reserve until it reaches 20% of the total subscribed and paid-
up capital. Furthermore, article #71 of the Act points out that all net profits shall be distributed to shareholders as 
dividends after being deducted from the reserves, unless otherwise determined by the general meeting of shareholders. 
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their control over a firm. Conversely, for minority shareholders, such a policy could be interpreted 
as the expropriation of their rights to obtain cash dividends.  
The main findings of our study are as follows. The probit analyses report a highly negative 
association between agency costs and the likelihood of firms to pay dividends in the framework of 
conflicts between managers and shareholders, and highly positive association between the 
propensity to pay dividends with the state ownership. We further report a highly negative 
relationship  between family ownership and dividends based on the  robust OLS findings and the 
Heckman procedure addressing the sample selection bias. These results can possibly suggest that 
family shareholders may obtain private benefits by preferring lower dividends. Conversely, the 
effect of state ownership is positive toward paying more dividends and we obtained similar results 
as far as the position of the second largest shareholders is concerned. Finally, the factors related to 
board structure reveal that larger boards promote dividends, although independent board members 
fail in this aspect.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 examines the existing literature and development 
of the hypotheses. Section 3 explains the models, methods and data used in this study. In Section 4, 
we report and explain the regression results, which are extensively discussed in Section 5. Finally, 
the last section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
2.1. The Hypotheses 
Agency theory is highly relevant in the study of issues of family governance (Carney, 2005). 
Claessens et al. (1999) hypothesize that family ownership leads to the expropriation of minority 
shareholders, and then find that family-dominated firms have a positive impact on cash flow rights 
but a negative impact on control rights. This evidence supports the view that minority shareholder 
expropriation occurs in firms dominated by a high level of family control. In the context of this 
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unification of ownership and control, family-oriented firms should have low agency costs (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1979). However, Fama and Jensen (1983) identify several inefficiencies and value-
reducing incentives in publicly traded family firms, such as underinvestment, inefficient risk bearing 
and minority shareholder expropriation.  
La Porta et al. (2000a) point out that in the family-dominated firms of Indonesia, the top 
managers of such firms are influenced by the family, which has substantial control, indicating that 
the managers are at an arm’s length from the shareholder (i.e., the family). Consequently, 
managerial behaviour can potentially represent shareholders’ interests. As a consequence, less 
conflict occurs due to the convergence of interest between them. However, the managers can act, 
under family control, to maximize the family’s wealth to the detriment of minority shareholders via 
tunnelling or assets expropriation using their business group (Bertrand et al., 2000).  
Claessens and Fan (2002) argue that firms with more prevalent family control tend to be less 
protective of minority shareholders. Consequently, they are more vulnerable to assets expropriation 
committed by controlling shareholders. Consistent with the argument of Faccio et al. (2001), Asian 
values are characterised by the dominance of family loyalties, which tends to foster crony capitalism 
through the activity of an intra-group of business transactions serving to remove corporate resources. 
Under such family control, managers can use investments in the firm’s cash flows for low returns 
or unprofitable projects, thus serving as another form of expropriation. Hence, such firms tend to 
pay less dividends. Therefore, we posit that: 
 
H1. Firms with  higher family ownership levels are associated with lower dividends payment or 
lower probability of paying dividends. 
 Mishra and Narender (1996) argue that, as the main owner, the state should rather obtain 
dividends due to the regulation of minimum dividend declaration unless there are proposals in hand 
for expansion or diversification. However, they report that SOEs in India pay a stagnant dividends 
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per share in contrast to the increasing earnings per share. In a study based in China, where most of 
the publicly listed firms are state-owned, Wei et al. (2004) find that state ownership has a positive 
correlation with cash dividends. This finding is supported via another study in China by Bradford 
et al. (2007), who report that state ownership influences the cash dividends paid out; that is, the 
lower the state ownership, the lower the cash dividends. Recently, He and Kyaw (2018) show the 
importance of managerial and state ownership in China regarding investment inefficiency and 
dividends. 
In Indonesia, many SOEs were established through the process of nationalizing what had 
previously been Dutch companies in the 1950s. However, the privatization programs of the 1990s 
and 2000s have driven some SOEs to list their shares on the stock market. This has brought 
consequences for their corporate governance, particularly in terms of a transition from a more 
feudalistic management to open and professional management. Once they become public firms, the 
investors require professional governance similar to that of private firms, including dividend 
decisions. In Indonesia, dividends from the SOEs are the main source of revenue for the 
governmental budget, besides tax receipts. Owing to the investor requirement for better governance, 
and government expectations for obtaining more revenues, SOEs are then expected to pay high 
dividends; therefore our study proposes the following hypothesis:  
H2. Firms with higher state shares tend to pay more dividends or have higher tendency to pay 
dividends.  
Agency costs are not directly unobservable (Baker and Weigand, 2015) but they emerge as a product 
of inefficiency of contractual relationship between corporate insiders and outside investors. Either 
managers or controlling shareholders with significant  rights may use a firm’s resources for their 
own benefits. In a firm, if an owner is also its manager, the  agency conflicts tend to be minimal. 
However, within publicly listed firms owned by various shareholders, the contractual relationships 
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bring about such conflicts whereby the managers (agents) may act for their own interests, which can 
be detrimental to shareholders’ wealth.  
 
La Porta et al. (2000b) argue that the conflict of interests occurs between corporate insiders and 
outside investors. The insiders can use firms’ assets for their own benefit through various ways: 
excessive salaries, transfer pricing to other corporation under the same group of business,  diverting 
assets or assets sales to themselves (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In the context of managers-
shareholders conflict, owners should effectively monitor and control managers to align their 
interests. Additionally, managers having better information regarding their firms should act on 
shareholders’ best interests. As agency costs arise due to the complexity of modern corporations, 
shareholders seek ways to alleviate such risks by reducing the likelihood of managers to expropriate  
firms’ cash reserves. Further, a problem arises when conflicts of interest occur between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders. Effective corporate governance mechanisms with strong 
protection for minority shareholders may be one of the ways to reduce such conflicts. Easterbrook 
(1984) suggests that paying dividends provides a mechanism to reduce agency cost of free cash flow 
from inappropriate expending by managers or controlling shareholders. On the other hand, John and 
Knyazeva (2006) find evidence that firms with lower agency costs- as a result of well-governed 
firms- pay lower level of dividends.   
Faccio et al. (2001) document that Indonesia is characterized as a country with high 
ownership concentration, low dividend payments, and poor corporate governance. These 
characteristics are potential to increase agency cost of free cash flows as firms’ managers and 
controlling shareholders can expropriate cash for their own benefits. In addition, firms with high 
ownership concentration have potential violation of minority shareholders’ interests as well as 
agency conflicts between managers and controlling shareholders (Fairchild et al., 2014). Agency 
theory posits that unless corporate profits are paid out to shareholders, corporate insiders may use 
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the profits for their private benefits (see e.g., La Porta et al., 2000b). Similarly,  Jensen (1986) argues 
that dividends can help mitigate agency problems as excessive free cash flows tend to be used by 
managers in inefficient ways. 
Shareholders or potential investors perceive that firms with high agency conflicts are 
associated with high risks due to the inappropriate use of firms’ cash holdings by managers. In 
addition, the presence of such substantial agency conflicts hints potentially poor corporate 
governance practices. To compensate for such risks, they require higher dividends payments. Thus, 
we hypothesize that there is positive association between agency costs and level of dividend 
payments.  
H3. Firms with higher agency conflicts tend to pay higher dividends or have higher tendency to pay 
dividends.  
2.2. The Other Considerations 
2.2.1. Degree of ownership concentration 
La Porta et al. (2000a) and Claessens et al. (1999) identify substantial differences in firm 
ownership between common law and civil law countries; and recently Jabbouri (2016) considers 
such country-specific differences when analysing the dividend policies of firms in Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region. Firms in common law countries, characterized by dispersed 
ownership and strong protection for minority shareholders, pay higher dividends than those in civil 
law countries. However, in the context of agency theory, the separation of ownership and control in 
dispersed ownership allows managers to pursue their own benefits due to less control from 
shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000a). In contrast, firms in civil law countries are associated with a 
high degree of concentration, weak property rights, an inefficient judicial system, and weak 
performance on the part of corporations (Claessens et al., 1999). Recent studies document the 
potential conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in firms 
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with a high degree of concentration (Claessens et al., 1999; La Porta et al., 2000a). Large 
shareholders with almost full control over the firm tend to obtain private benefits by accumulating 
more cash and paying lower dividends (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Mancinelli and Ozkan, 2006). 
Therefore, the higher the level of ownership concentration, the lower the dividends paid by the firm.  
 Claessens and Fan (2002) argue that firms with high ownership concentration tend to be less 
protective of minority shareholders concerning assets expropriation. Means of expropriation on the 
part of the controlling shareholders include intergroup sales and services, transfer pricing, and the 
control of assets and other stakes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Claessens et al., 1999). In addition, 
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) find that an increase in stakes controlled by the largest shareholders 
gives rise to a substantial increase in the level of concentration, which in turn tends to decrease 
dividend payouts. 
2.2.2. The role of second largest shareholders 
Multiple controlling shareholders may have an important role in determining dividend policy 
due to their power. Faccio et al. (2001) reveal different findings across countries regarding the 
existence of multiple shareholders in dividend policy. They claim that the presence of another large 
shareholder reduces agency conflict in European firms, but in East Asian firms the other large 
controlling shareholder tends to collude in expropriating the minority shareholders by paying lower 
dividends. On the other hand, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) find that the second largest shareholder 
is positively associated with dividends, meaning that their presence can alleviate agency conflict 
between majority and minority shareholders. In contrast, in examining Italian firms, Mancinelli and 
Ozkan (2006) highlight the importance of the second largest shareholder in corporate dividend 
policy. 
2.2.3. Foreign ownership 
14 
 
Another common characteristic of emerging markets, such as Indonesia, is the presence of 
foreign shareholders. Their existence has significantly increased due to the impact of the 
liberalisation of the Indonesia Capital Market after the 1997-1998 crisis, whereby firms are now 
allowed to acquire up to 95% equity stake. When investigating Korean firms, Min and Bowman 
(2015) find that capital mobility from foreign investors is significantly influenced by the 
improvement of corporate governance system. This suggests that foreign investors seek target 
investment  in low risk countries by expecting adequate return on their investment.  Douma et al. 
(2006) argue that foreign investors have established substantial ownership in many industries in 
order to support their international operations. Chari et al. (2009) also argue that firms under the 
control of multinational corporations (MNCs) can realize gains and benefits through the attribution 
of the transfer of superior technology, a strong organizational capital and culture, and access to 
international capital markets. Foreign investors need more transparent information about how firms 
are managed. In addition, better supervision and control by MNCs enable a firm to promote better 
governance practices than those of domestic firms. In terms of dividends, foreign investors may 
require higher dividends to compensate for additional risk taking. Similarly, in a study conducted 
in Japan, Baba (2009) finds that foreign ownership has a positive and significant association with 
dividends.  
Baba (2009) and Jeon et al. (2011) point out that foreign investors face a higher degree of 
informational asymmetry compared to domestic shareholders, which therefore leads firms to pay 
more dividends as opposed to retaining the earnings. On the other hand, Kim et al. (2007) find that 
U.S.-owned foreign subsidiaries pay a stable dividend repatriation to their U.S. parent, while the 
subsidiaries’ dividend policy does not tend to follow their parent’s dividend policy. Moreover, Jeon 
et al. (2011) affirm that the monitoring function of foreign institutional investors in emerging 
markets is more effective than domestic institutional investors because they apply global standards 
and practices.   
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2.2.4. Board size 
 
The role of the board is very significant as it performs the critical function of monitoring and 
advising top management (Coles et al., 2008). In addition, Boone et al. (2007) and Coles et al. (2008) 
explain that the size of the board is perceived to increase its effectiveness. However, other studies 
report that larger boards are less effective than smaller boards because of the lack of coordination 
and the problem of free-riding directors (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Coles et al. (2008) argue that 
large, complex and diversified firms should have larger boards to employ more experience, 
knowledge and better advice. However, Linck et al. (2008) find different evidence that firms with 
high R&D expenditure and high growth opportunities are associated with smaller boards, thus 
revealing that large firms do not always have larger boards. Linck et al. (2008) further find that 
firms structure their boards by considering the cost and benefits of the monitoring and advising 
performed by the board. As the main function of a board is to monitor and advise (Raheja, 2005), 
the larger the size, the more effective the management functions will be, while the managers, in turn, 
will be less likely to be prone to extract private benefits. Therefore, firms with larger boards will 
have better governance and pay higher dividends since larger boards bring more experience and 
knowledge to the table (Dalton et al., 1999), while complex, diversified and debt-financed firms 
have a greater need for advice and should have larger boards (Coles et al., 2008). We should expect 
that the larger the size of the board, the better the governance and therefore the higher dividend 
payments.  
2.2.5. Board independence 
 
The proportion of non-independent (inside directors) and independent (outside directors) 
members of a board is also an important factor to consider. Coles et al. (2008) argue that higher 
board independence allows for more effective monitoring of management, particularly for R&D 
intensive firms. Such firms are likely to benefit from the representation of large insiders on the board 
to employ their specific expertise. However, Linck et al. (2008) find that firms with high R&D 
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expenditure and high growth are associated with less independent boards. They support the evidence 
that the more independent boards exist in a firm, the more opportunity they have to extract private 
benefits. Interestingly, this study also reveals that large firms do not always have more independent 
boards. The existence of an independent board in a board structure complements the insider 
members of the board insofar as the former provide more independent monitoring. However, the 
independent board members usually have less information about a firm’s constraints and 
opportunities (Linck et al., 2008). On the other hand, Raheja (2005) argues that insiders have an 
important role in supplying an important source of information for the boards, however they may 
have distorted objectives due to the lack of independence from the CEO and private benefits. This 
argument is consistent with Hermalin and Weisbach's (1988) suggestion that firms with more 
complex operations should maintain more independent members on the board in order to provide 
expertise and advice to the CEO. The presence of more outsiders should be associated with higher 
dividends. 
2.2.6. Duality 
The identification of the position of chairman and CEO, whether or not they are held by the 
same person, is an important issue in measuring the strength of the governance mechanism.7 At the 
same time, the division of positions between different people is intended to maintain individual 
authority and power. As Arcot and Bruno (2006) argue, the separation of chairman and CEO is an 
important mechanism to ensure a balance and clarity of power and authority. The authors contend 
that there should be a clear division of the authority and responsibilities of the chairman and CEO, 
in order that each of them have unfettered powers. Therefore, to support good governance, firms 
with a separation between CEO and chairman often produce better governance. In addition, Linck 
et al. (2008) use the term ‘combined leadership’ to describe the CEO/chairman duality, suggesting 
                                                          
7 See Karpavičius and Yu (2018) who examine the relationship between CEO stock incentives with dividend protection 
and the value and riskiness of corporations. 
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that such a duality will increase his/her bargaining power and influence the firm’s strategic decision-
making. Therefore, maintaining a dual position for the CEO/chairman will be more likely to 
engender unfair decisions at the cost of the minority shareholders. In other words, firms with CEO 
and chairman duality are vulnerable to lower quality corporate governance practices (see e.g., 
Setiawan and Phua, 2013) because too much power is concentrated in one person, which might 
suggest lower dividend payments.   
2.2.7. Group affiliation 
 
 A business group is a common organizational form in many countries. The group can take 
a pyramidal structure, a cross-holding form, or an even a more complex structure such as keiretsu 
(Japan) or chaebol (Korea). In Indonesia, a conglomeration of businesses is very common, whereby 
a group of companies covers several business activities and crosses industry sectors. However, the 
presence of a business group can make minority shareholders fear expropriation due to weak 
corporate law and lax enforcement mechanisms, this particularly applies in developing economies 
(Bertrand et al., 2000). Bertrand et al. (2000) find that the owners of business groups expropriate 
minority shareholders by tunnelling their firms’ resources to other firms within the group of 
businesses. They argue that various forms of tunnelling, such as inter-firm loans with high or low 
interest rate, transfer pricing manipulation, and asset selling with an inappropriate price among their 
group of business are practices performed by owners of business groups who have substantial 
control over the firms. As the presence of group affiliation implies higher expropriation risk, this 
then is likely to lower dividend payments.  
2.2.8. Firm characteristics 
 
This study considers a number of company level control variables following the relevant 
literature. Larger firms tend to generate higher profits due to their economies of scale and scope, 
while they have a greater ease of access to sources of finance at a lower cost. Therefore, such firms 
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are more likely to pay higher dividends, as evidenced by Fama and French (2001), Holder et al. 
(1998) and Grullon et al. (2002), among others. According to Smith and Watts (1992), size may be 
an important variable when detecting a conflict of interests between majority and minority 
shareholders; they nonetheless failed to detect a strong link between size and dividends. On the 
other hand, firms with high growth options might spend their earnings to finance growth. Grullon 
et al. (2002) and Fama and French (2001) point out that growth firms pay less dividends as external 
financing tends to be costly due to information asymmetry concerns between lenders and borrowers. 
Rozeff (1982), Lloyd et al. (1985) and Schooley and Barney (1994) have produced similar 
conclusions. Baba (2009) argues that firms with future growth opportunities signal good prospects 
to the shareholders. Bhattacharya's (1980) signalling hypothesis implies that firms with high future 
investment options tend to have their stocks undervalued by the market, which suggests that such 
firms pay less dividends to signal their expected good future profitability. 
Rozeff (1982) argues that firms with high leverage pay lower dividends due to the 
transaction costs of external financing and payments to creditors. Mancinelli and Ozkan (2006) 
argue that firms bearing high debt face a high risk of financial distress, and as such they tend to 
accumulate cash to avoid cash shortfall. Similarly, Baba (2009) points out that firms with higher 
debt ratios tend to have lower free cash flows, and hence pay lower dividends. Leverage plays a 
vital role in reducing the conflict between majority and minority shareholders due to increasing 
external monitoring from creditors. If a firm has high debt, the cash flow available for dividends is 
low because of principal and interest payments, and it will, in turn, lower dividend payments. 
Furthermore, as profitability is one of the main sources of dividend payments, we would expect a 
positive association between profitability and dividends, as reported by Fama and French (2001), 
among others.  
3. Methods and Data 
3.1. The source of data 
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We employ data from Reuters Datastream as well as hand-picked data retrieved from the 2013 
audited annual financial statement of the non-financial firms listed on the IDX (www.idx.co.id). As 
of December 2013, there were 464 listed firms, but after subtracting financial firms (74 firms), 
missing and incomplete data (16 firms) and delisted firms (5 firms), we finally obtained 369 sample 
firms to use in this analysis. Financial firms were excluded from the sample due to the fundamental 
differences in terms of regulation compared to non-financial firms. These exclusion criteria follow 
those of previous studies of Fama and French (2001) and Denis and Osobov (2008), among others.  
3.2. Dependent and explanatory variables  
This study uses four dependent variables: (i) Payer, a binary variable taking the value of 1 
for dividend payers and 0 for non-payers; (ii) dividend per share (DPS); (iii) total dividends over 
total assets (DIVTA); and (iv) dividend payout ratio (DPR).  
The explanatory variables are grouped into: (i) types and identity of share ownership and (ii) agency 
conflicts. High agency costs may stem from poor investment decisions such as the purchase of 
unproductive assets, which in return reduces revenues. Following Ang et al. (2000), we consider 
two proxies to quantify agency conflicts between managers and shareholders: (a) expenses ratio, 
which measures the effectiveness of the firm’s management to control operating costs and other 
costs related to managerial excessive consumption, and (b) asset utilization ratio, which measures 
the effectiveness of the firm’s management to deploy its assets. For the conflicts between small and 
large shareholders, we employ the constructs  Degree of concentration, High concentration, Second 
largest and First second. The other groups for the explanatory factors are: iii) level of ownership 
concentration, (iv) corporate governance and board structure, and (v) other firm-specific factors as 
controlling variables. Table A1 in the Appendix provides the definitions of the variables. 
3.3. The empirical model  
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This study adopts the probit, OLS, and Heckman’s two-step estimation procedures. The 
probit method analyses the ‘propensity’ to pay; that is, the factors affecting the likelihood of IDX 
firms paying dividends, whereas the OLS regressions capture factors affecting the ‘intensity’ of 
payments. Heckman’s (1979) approach is used to capture the two-step decision-making of dividend 
policy to address the sample selection bias due to the possibility that some potential determinants 
affect payout decisions. The Heckman procedure reduces the selection bias by incorporating into 
the analysis the factors that lead firms to pay or not to pay cash dividends before examining the 
magnitude of dividend payments. The use of this procedure is important and relevant in examining 
some of the potential determinants affecting both dividend decisions: the decision whether or not to 
pay (propensity to pay dividends) and how much to pay (level of dividend payments). The models 
are as follows: 
Propensity to pay (Probit): 
Prob (Yi > 0) = β0 + β1Familyi  + β2Statei + β3Agency conflicti  + β4Concentration i + β5Secondi +  
 Β6Foreigni + β7Board sizei + β8Board independencei + β9Dualityi + β10Group affiliationi +  
β11Sizei + β12Price to booki + β13Growthi + β14Leveragei + β15Profitabilityi + εi                            (1) 
       
 
Intensity of payments (OLS):  
 
E(DPS, DIVTA, DPR|Yi>0) = β0 + β1Familyi  + β2Statei + β3Agency conflicti  + β4Concentrationi+ 
 β5Secondi + β6Foreigni + β7Board sizei + β8Board independencei + β9Dualityi + β10Group  
affiliation i + β11Sizei + β12Price to booki + β13Growthi + β14Leveragei + β15Profitabilityi +  
β16Lambdai + vi   
                                     (2)  
  
where “Prob (Yi>0)” represents a firm’s likelihood to pay dividends; “Yi” represents the level of 
dividend payments based on the variable DPS, DIVTA or DPR; “E(DPS, DIVTA, DPR|Yi>0” 
represents the expected level of dividends conditioned upon if firms pay dividends; βs are the 
estimable parameters; εi and vi are the error terms that are jointly normally distributed with zero 
21 
 
means and with the correlation of ρ; “Lambda” is the inverse Mill’s ratio obtained from Eq. (1) and 
inserted into Eq. (2) for the purpose of selection correction.8  
Regarding the explanatory variables: “Family” represents the ownership held by family 
members based on the variable Family ownership 1, Family ownership 2, Family ownership 3 or 
Controlling family; “State” represents the ownership held by the State based on the variable State 
ownership 1, State ownership 2, or Controlling State; “Concentration” is the stock ownership  
concentration of a firm i based on the variable Degree of concentration, or High concentration; 
“Second” represents the ownership level of the second largest shareholder based on the variable 
Second largest or First second; “Foreign” represents the ownership held by foreign shareholders 
based on the variable Foreign ownership 1, Foreign ownership 2, or Controlling foreign; “Board 
size” represents the size of the board; “Board independence” represents the proportion of outside 
board members; “Duality” indicates the presence of dual role of CEO and Chairman; “Group 
affiliation” shows if firms belong to any business group; “Size” measures the firm size; “Price to 
book” represents future growth options; “Growth” is a proxy for current growth rate; “Leverage” 
represents the capital structure mix and “Profitability” is return on assets. All of the variables are 
defined in the Appendix.  
4. Results and Findings 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table A2 provides correlation matrix of all variables used in this study. Correlation coefficients 
above 0.5 are marked with bold &asterisk. The variance inflation factors (VIFs) confirm that we do 
not suffer from the multicollinearity problem as the figures are well below 10. 
                                                          
8 We used the same explanatory variables in both the selection and output equations as one can assume that the factors 
impacting the propensity to pay dividends are also expected to influence the amount of dividend payments (see e.g. 
Fama and French, 2001 and Huang et al., 2011). Both models also include industry dummies. A significant Mill’s ratio 
implies the presence of the sample selection bias. 
22 
 
Table 1 exhibits the descriptive statistics. The table shows that the mean dividends per share (DPS) 
is IDR28.32 with a standard deviation of IDR80.75. The relatively high standard deviation and low 
mean indicate that the DPS of the IDX firms is highly dispersed across the firms. The dividends as 
a proportion of total assets records the mean of 1.6% with standard deviation of 5.9%. Further, 47% 
of our sample firms paid cash dividends. 
The level of concentration, on average, is about 61%, indicating that most of the firms are 
to be placed in the category of concentrated ownership. The potential role of the second largest 
shareholders in decision-making seems significant as their proportion of holding shares is 18%; the 
same argument can be put forward for the foreign shareholders, who own over 19% of the shares. 
Also, the divergence between the proportion of shares held by the first and second largest 
shareholders is 23%, which suggests that the IDX firms may not have sufficient balance of power 
with regards to key block holders. 
In Indonesia, families may use indirect ownership via cross-holdings. The direct ownership 
level for this type of shareholder is close to 4%. We identified 19 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
in this study, and the State has one share in each of the firms with almost absolute voting rights.9 
The level of state ownership is, on average, 3%. Table 1 also shows that an average board consists 
of four directors. It also reveals that the proportion of outsiders on a typical board is close to 41%.  
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Table 2 presents the distribution of equity ownership across different ranges, showing the 
level of investment made by the largest shareholders. The information in this table is intended to 
give a more comprehensive picture of the level of concentration of the listed Indonesian firms, 
particularly regarding the stock ownership by the largest shareholders. The first row indicates that 
there are 7 firms with the corresponding proportion of 1.9% in which the largest shareholder 
                                                          
9 This share is called “red and white share” representing the colour on the Indonesian flag. 
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possesses at least 90% of stocks. The last line informs us that there are 6 firms in which the largest 
shareholder possesses 9.99% of stocks or less, suggesting that only 1.63% of our sample companies 
can be categorized as highly dispersed firms. Table 2 indicates that when we use 10% as a cut-off 
point for ownership, over 96% of firms are controlled by a single largest shareholder. In addition, 
the most common range is between 30% and 39.99 %, constituting 63 firms or 17.07% of total firms. 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Table 3 presents the distribution of sample firms based on the industry classification. The second 
and third columns display the number of firms which pay dividends and do not pay dividends, 
respectively. The 4th column shows the number of firms in each industry either as dividend payers 
or non-payers. The trade and service group has the largest proportion with 98 firms (26.56%), 
followed by basic industry sector with 58 firms (15.72%). The smallest proportion is the agriculture 
group with only 15 firms (4.07%).  
Column 6 shows the proportion of firms which pay dividends for each industry. The 
agriculture industry has the largest proportion (66.67%), followed by the consumer goods industry. 
The last column of Table 3 shows the average DPS in each industry and reveals that firms in the 
consumer goods (property and real estate) industry have the highest (lowest) DPS. 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]  
4.2. Econometric Analyses 
4.2.1 Probit regressions  
Table 4 analyses the determinants of paying cash dividends in the IDX firms. Panel A reports 
the marginal effects estimates within the framework of managers-shareholders conflict whereas 
Panel B shows the results for the major-minor shareholders conflicts of interest.   
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The results in panels A  and B Table 4 reveal that the family ownership-related variables 
have no significant effects on the propensity to pay dividends, which does not support our hypothesis 
1. Yet, model 1 suggests some economic significance pertaining to family ownership: the  
corresponding marginal effect indicates that the likelihood of paying dividends increases by 25.5 
percentage points as a response to the increase of one standard deviation  (i.e., 11.9%) of the family 
ownership, keeping the other variables at their mean values.   
In Panel B, the effect of the state ownership on the probability of paying dividends is positive 
and the relationship is statistically significant for the proxy Controlling State. This finding is in line 
with our hypothesis 2 and suggests that the State has high interests on the dividend payments. The 
marginal effects in models 7 and 8 imply that when the largest shareholder is the State (as opposed 
to when it is not), the propensity to pay cash dividends goes up by about 30 percentage points. 
Furthermore, Panel A shows that agency conflicts are highly and negatively associated with 
the tendency to pay dividends. This finding provides evidence that firms with high level of agency 
conflicts are less likely to pay dividends.10 Regarding the implications for the second type of agency 
conflicts, in Panel B, the marginal effect in model 5 suggests that a one-standard deviation increase 
in the degree of ownership concentration (i.e., 20.1%) raises the propensity to pay dividends by 7.5 
percentage points but the regression coefficient is statistically insignificant. Moreover, the marginal 
effect on Second largest in column 7 suggests that the likelihood of paying dividends increases by 
over 17.5 percentage points as a response to one standard deviation increase (i.e., 11.5%) in the 
proportion of stocks held by the second largest shareholders. The effect for the other alternative 
factor, namely First second, as a proxy for the monitoring/moderating role of the second largest 
shareholder over the largest shareholder does not bear any statistical significance. Overall, it seems 
                                                          
10 We use the reciprocal of asset turnover ratio as a proxy for this type of agency conflicts and report the results 
accordingly. We also use expense ratio as an alternative proxy: this ratio measures the effectiveness of the firm’s 
management to control operating costs and other costs related to managerial excessive consumption. The untabulated 
regressions (available upon request) show that both constructs yield results that are qualitatively the same. 
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the conflicts among small and large shareholders in Indonesia do not significantly influence the 
decision whether to pay dividends. 
The effects of foreign ownership-related variables on the propensity of paying dividends are 
insignificant in both panels. Further, among the board structure variables, only Board size is 
statistically significant; its positive coefficient indicates that the probability of paying dividends is 
heightened by a larger number of board members. Finally, in Panel A, all the firm-specific 
characteristics are significant: Size, Price to book and Profitability (Growth) are positively 
(negatively) correlated to the propensity to pay dividends; in Panel B, Leverage is the only 
insignificant firm-specific factor.  
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
4.2.2. The OLS analysis for the level of dividend payments  
Table 5 exhibits the OLS results, focusing on the potential conflicts between managers and 
shareholders. Panel B provides evidence that all family ownership-related variables show highly 
negative association with the level of dividends relative to assets. This set of results supports our 
expectation as predicted in hypothesis 1.  
The effect of the state ownership on the level of  dividends is positive in all panels, and the 
relationship is generally statistically significant. These findings support our hypothesis 2, and imply 
that the State as a major shareholder has some high interests on corporate payouts and considers 
cash dividends as important source of revenue for the governmental budget.  
The  important finding revealed in Table 5 is that firms with higher level of agency costs 
have lower level of dividend payments. This result is not in line with our hypothesis 3 and indicates 
that firms with higher agency conflicts prefer to retain cash. Possibly, such firms would want to 
avoid costly external borrowing and hence intend to increase their internal reserves for future use. 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
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Table 6 provides the OLS results, focusing on the perspective of minor-major shareholders 
conflicts of interest. Panel B reveals that, as predicted in our hypothesis 1, family ownership is 
associated with lower dividends relative to assets. In addition, we report consistent results in all 
panels showing that the level or presence of state ownership is positively correlated to the amount 
of dividend payments in IDX firms, which confirms our hypothesis 2. 
The variable Second largest has a positive and significant coefficient estimate in Panel A, 
which suggests that the level of shareholdings by the second largest shareholders may influence 
Indonesian managers’ decisions to pay more dividends. It is possible that this is an attempt to  
mitigate the potential expropriation risks. 
Regarding the board structure variables, firms with a larger board size have significantly 
higher dividends per share and dividend payout ratios. Also, almost all of the firm-specific factors 
except leverage are significantly related to  dividend payments: firms with higher price-to-book ratio 
and profitability or firms with lower growth pay more dividends. DPS is the only dependent variable 
with a significant association with firm size. Another finding is that although higher future growth 
options means paying more dividends, the opposite holds for the current growth levels. 
 [PLEASE INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
4.2.3. Heckman procedure  
This section is intended to check the robustness of the previous analyses regarding the 
consistency of the results by considering the potential sample selection bias that is inherent in studies 
of dividend policy decisions. Table 7 focuses on the conflicts between managers and shareholders 
and table 8 reflects on the minor and major shareholders’ conflicts. In panels B and C in Table 7, 
based on the significant p-values pertaining to the Mill’s lambda, there is some evidence which 
suggests the presence of the issue of selection bias. It should also be noted that the Heckman 
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regression coefficients would still be consistent and efficient even if the sample selection bias is 
statistically not very salient (see e.g., Farrell et al., 2014).  
In Table 7, we observe that, except in one case, family and state ownership do not exert any 
significant influence on the amount of dividends once we figure out the determining factors why 
firms do (not) pay dividends. On the other hand, Table 7 shows that, again, the conflicts between 
managers and shareholders lead to more conservative dividend policy.  
In Panel B Table 8, the family ownership-related variables exert highly significant and 
negative impacts on the level of dividend payments, suggesting that family ownership is associated 
with lower dividends. Consistent with the previous results in Table 6, these findings provide 
evidence again for our hypothesis 1. Regarding the state ownership, we again report similar results 
as the coefficients are generally positive and significant, which supports our hypothesis 2. On the 
other hand, as in the previous analyses, our variables related to conflicts among small and large 
shareholders do not appear to have significant effects on the level of dividend payments. 
In tables 7 and 8, board size has consistently strong and positive correlations with dividends. 
This may suggest that board size can have a significant role in promoting better corporate 
governance by alleviating the conflict of interests between majority and minority shareholders. In 
contrast, the negative correlation between board independence and dividend payments (see table 7) 
may indicate the poor implementation of corporate governance principles in the IDX firms owing 
to the ineffective role of outsider members. Tables 7 and 8 show that all other firm-specific variables 
obtain similar coefficient estimates under the Heckman procedure and are comparable to the OLS 
results. 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 7 AND TABLE 8 HERE] 
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5. Discussion 
This study gives evidence that the structure of Indonesian listed firms is characterised by 
concentrated ownership, whereby 91% of firms are under a single and largest shareholder who holds 
at least 20% of company shares. This finding is consistent with La Porta et al. (1999) who find that 
most Asian firms fall under this concentrated ownership. In an effort to reduce ownership 
concentration of IDX firms, the Indonesian government has given an incentive of tax reduction for 
firms whose shares are held by public at a minimum of 40% (Wardhana et al., 2014). Wardhana et 
al. (2014) report that controlling shareholders of Indonesian firms, generally non-financial firms 
with a close relationship with the founder family, have dominant roles in determining dividend 
policy and even surpassing the authority of corporate managers. They further document that such 
shareholders have the power to decide not only on dividend policy but also on the firms’ other 
strategic decisions such as capital structure, target profit or issuing new equity, which has some 
implications for macroeconomic indicators. This fact contrasts with the situation in the U.K. and the 
U.S., in which the concentration of ownership by a single shareholder is uncommon (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). In addition, in the U.S., the market has the power to force management to distribute 
cash dividends to investors (Bradford et al., 2007).  
Large shareholders tend to consume private benefits by accumulating more cash and paying 
lower dividends, and when ownership is in the hands of dominant shareholders, they can effectively 
control and monitor managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Jeon et al., 2011). Such effective controls 
could provide the benefits of alleviating the divergence of interests and reducing the agency problem 
which arises between the principal and agent (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Short et al., 2002). 
However, in the context of Indonesia, another situation is that the composition of the boards of 
directors is family-related, which can be identified by looking at the surnames of board members. 
This study is consistent with the evidence found by La Porta et al. (1999) confirming that in such 
firms the family often supplies the CEO. Therefore, this study suggests that higher concentrated 
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ownership can be an indication of effective monitoring and control of shareholders towards 
managers.  
An important finding of this study is that family-related variables have a negative and 
significant relationship with dividends, suggesting that family-controlled firms pay less dividends. 
This evidence supports Faccio et al. (2001), who argue that such firms are vulnerable to the 
expropriation of minority shareholders by distributing low dividends. Another possible explanation 
is that such firms preserve earnings to support internal financing because, by avoiding the use of 
external financing to finance new investments, family-oriented shareholders would aim to protect  
their ownership and control within the firm. Our study suggests that the implementation of projects 
may be hindered by high agency conflicts and sub-optimal behaviour of family-controlled firms. 
Clearly, this aspect suggests that the intricacies and conflicts within the listed Indonesian firms will 
influence corporate financial and real investment decisions that would have direct links with the 
economic growth. Our discussion is parallel to the issues raised by Mallick and Yang (2011) who 
emphasise that the conflicts of interests impact firms’ financial and innovation decisions. In addition, 
although family-controlled firms have low agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1979), a manager of 
an Indonesian firm may act to maximize the family’s wealth at the risk of minority shareholders via 
assets’ expropriation.  
The positive and significant correlation between state ownership and dividends indicates that 
the state tends to require high dividends. This evidence is supported by other empirical studies in 
emerging markets such as in India by Mishra and Narender (1996), and in China by Wei et al. (2004) 
and Bradford et al. (2007). In Indonesia, public SOEs run strategic businesses including those in the 
pharmaceutical industry, infrastructure, mining and telecommunications. Some SOEs also obtain 
benefits from a monopolistic position in various sectors such as gas (PT Perusahaan Gas Negara), 
telecommunications (PT Telkom) and mining exploration (PT Tambang Timah). Historically, the 
involvement of government on business activities can be traced back into the nationalization of 
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Dutch companies occurred in 1950s. Moreover, these findings signal that dividends are important 
for government, and listed SOEs serve as cash-cows for the government to foster non-tax revenues.11  
We find that the link between foreign ownership and dividends is insignificant. This is 
inconsistent with Baba (2009) and Jeon et al. (2011) who argue that foreign investors require high 
dividends to compensate for a higher degree of informational asymmetry. High dividends can be 
understood as compensation for both the increase in risk and the cost of monitoring. Nevertheless, 
with regards to the monitoring costs due to the distance of the location between foreign investors 
and the firm, this may not be a significant obstacle. This can be explained by the fact that most of 
the foreign institutional investors are Singapore-headquartered corporations or multinationals 
having a branch office in Singapore. With respect to our main findings, the negative association 
between the intensity of agency conflicts and dividends- owing to underdeveloped capital and 
money markets in Indonesia- may drive the insignificant relationship between dividends and foreign 
ownership. 
This study finds evidence that the presence of second largest shareholders can have effects 
on corporate dividend policy. However, this finding conflicts with the study by Mancinelli and 
Ozkan (2006). A possible explanation is that the largest and the second largest shareholders have 
the chain into the same ultimate control of shareholders, which is particularly the case in the family-
controlled firms. Another explanation is that, in many firms, the second largest shareholder with 
more than 10% stake or a substantial amount of shares is regarded as a controlling shareholder. The 
Indonesian Stock Exchange requires that only a shareholding with a minimum 10% equity has 
voting rights in a firm’s annual general meeting. However, the regulation is not binding, entailing 
that a firm may apply their own particular regulation to set minimum equity and thus obtain control 
                                                          
11 For the years 2013 and 2014,  SOEs contribute to the government revenues as much as IDR34 trillion and IDR40 
trillion, respectively. 
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rights. These firms may issue a different class of stocks or set a specific agreement with particular 
shareholders regarding rights of control.  
A director’s individual power can influence the propensity and intensity of paying dividends. 
Such an effect may suggest that firms with a larger board size pay higher dividends, as this study 
reports. We can interpret this finding to imply that a firm with a larger board is potentially better 
governed than one with a smaller board, which is why the former will pay larger dividends. This 
result is consistent with Raheja (2005) and Coles et al. (2008) who argue that larger board size 
allows managers to function more effectively. This means that managers are less likely to extract 
private benefits.  
The governance mechanisms used by Indonesian firms have a unique structure -given the 
implementation of Company Act 2007. The board of commissioners has the authority to monitor 
the board of directors as firm executives. The appointment of an independent commissioner is 
mandatory, according to the regulations of the Indonesia Security Exchange Commission. This 
appointment is intended to promote corporate governance principles and mechanisms to protect 
minority shareholders’ interest from improper treatment by controlling shareholders or by managers. 
However, this study finds a negative correlation between board independence and dividends (see 
the Heckman results), suggesting that firms with more independent commissioners tend to pay less 
dividends. Furthermore, this denotes that  the presence of independent commissioners is not an 
effective device for monitoring the board of directors or promoting mechanisms of good governance 
because of their weak position compared to non-independent commissioners. Ideally, the 
independent commissioners would be acting as ‘the balance of power’ in relation to the non-
independent commissioners, who are commonly regarded as the main owners of the firm. This 
observation is related to the implications of the one of our main findings that have surprisingly 
showed that higher agency costs reduce dividend payments. 
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This finding contradicts the argument by Coles et al. (2008) that a number of independent 
board members allows for more effective monitoring of management. This raises the issue that 
insiders (the board of directors together with the majority shareholder) may expropriate minority 
shareholders regarding dividend payments by overriding the role of the independent commissioners. 
On the other hand, the negative correlation between the number of independent commissioners and 
dividends supports the substitution theory as discussed in La Porta et al. (2000b). According to this 
theory, poorly governed firms use dividends to gain the trust of the public regarding a firm’s interest 
in raising future equity from capital markets.  
Linck et al. (2008) argue that the duality (CEO/chairman) position increases bargaining 
power but tends to worsen corporate governance quality. Our study, however, failed to find a 
statistically significant link between duality and dividends. By examining the structure of boards in 
Indonesian listed firms, this study reveals that there are firms in which (a) the CEO is also the son 
of the president of the commissioner, (b) the president of the commissioner is the son of the firm’s 
founder, who is still alive, (c) the CEO and some directors are members of the family of main stock 
holders, and (d) the CEO is in the family of a member of the board of the commissioner.  
As predicted, company size is positively and significantly correlated with dividends, 
indicating that the larger the firm, the higher the dividend payments. This is consistent with the 
reasoning that the greater the stability and cash reserves of large firms, the greater the potential of 
the firm to pay more dividends (Lintner, 1956; Rozeff, 1982; Fama and French, 2001; Sawicki, 
2009). Grullon et al. (2002) also find that firms with larger assets pay much higher dividends than 
those with smaller assets. Smith and Watts (1992) argue that examining the relationship between 
assets and dividends provides a weak means of detecting a conflict of interest between majority and 
minority shareholders.  
According to Bhattacharya's (1980) signalling hypothesis, firms with higher future 
investments should pay less dividends. However, the IDX firms in our study showed an opposite 
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pattern, which may be related to the different characteristics of Indonesian capital markets.12 It 
should be noted that high growth firms in Indonesia do not necessarily have to have their stocks 
undervalued, which would, according to the signalling hypothesis, lead them to pay less dividends. 
On the other hand, we find that a firm’s current growth rate has a negative correlation with dividends. 
This is consistent with the findings of most of the previous studies (e.g., Grullon et al., 2002; Fama 
and French, 2001; Rozeff, 1982; Lloyd et al., 1985; and Schooley and Barney, 1994). This finding 
supports the argument that high growth firms prefer to retain their income as internal financing by 
not paying dividends, which is in line with the pecking order hypothesis proposed by Myers and 
Majluf (1984).  
Firm profitability shows a strong and positive correlation with dividend policy. This supports 
the evidence that firms with a high level of profitability will obtain more cash to pay high dividends 
(Fama and French, 2001; Mitton, 2004; Jeon et al., 2011). In the Indonesian context, dividend 
policies across firms are not uniform. One firm sets dividend payments at a maximum of 30% of 
net earnings. Other firms do not pay dividends because they must set a minimum amount for the 
statutory reserves and will pay dividends as long as the appropriation for statutory reserves is 
fulfilled. Consequently, the amount of dividends paid is determined by the residual net profit after 
being subtracted from the mandatory reserves set by the firms. Additionally, although firms are able 
to generate profit, they are not likely to pay dividends if the profit is only available for the minimum 
mandatory reserves.  
The structure of business groups (conglomeration) in the Indonesian business environment 
has become a common feature, much as in other Asian countries (Sato, 2004). However, they are 
not as complex as Japanese keiretsu with their interlocking structure. The growth of 
conglomerations cannot be separated from the firms’ strategy to exploit a wide variety of industries 
                                                          
12 Khurana et al. (2006) note that market imperfections and the low quality of institutions related to investors’ protection 
make external financing expensive and difficult to access, which is related to the case of Indonesia. They find that 
financial development of countries reduces the reliance of firms on internal financing. 
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to support their business operations and interests within the group. In addition, the conglomeration 
phenomenon that was pioneered by Indonesian-Chinese businessmen, who gained privileges by the 
New Order policy in the early 1970s, has been the machine of economic growth (Lasserre, 1993). 
Nevertheless, our study failed to find a significant relationship between dividends and business 
group affiliation. This finding contrasts with the study by De Jong et al. (2009), who raise the debt-
service hypothesis in explaining that the dividend decisions of firms within the group are affected 
by the parent of the firms, and that the parent influences the subsidiary’s dividend policy as an effort 
to seek external financing to pay the parent’s debt.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This study investigates how managers undertake payout decisions by focusing on corporate 
ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms in Indonesia, which has a unique 
business, legal and social environment. This study finds some salient evidence which can enrich the 
dividend policy literature particularly in developing markets. Renneboog and Szilagyi (2015) 
emphasized how they had reopened the debate as to whether the level of dividend payments is 
associated with different corporate governance regimes. Therefore, our paper is timely at least in 
the sense that their key findings contrast with ours. Our univariate analysis revealed that the listed 
Indonesian firms have a high level of concentration: as many as 96% (91%) of firms are 
concentrated with the single largest shareholder at least 10% (20%) of shares.  
Our first set of main findings reveals that the effects of state ownership on dividends are 
positive and significant, suggesting that the presence of the state as an influential shareholder can 
possibly help mitigate concerns related to expropriation risk in Indonesia. Our second set of main 
findings suggests that family ownership and dividend payments are negatively correlated. This 
evidence implies that the minority shareholders may be vulnerable to expropriation risk by family 
or large controlling shareholders, noting that this negative link can be attributed to pecking order 
theory of capital structure that family-owned firms might be following. Our third set of main results 
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shows that agency conflicts between managers and shareholders negatively affect the level of 
dividend payments, implying that firms tend to retain their earnings rather than returning to their 
shareholders. In other words, one can contend that firms with higher agency conflicts prefer to 
accumulate internal cash reserves rather than to seek funds from external borrowing.  On the other 
hand, the sizeable marginal effects based on the probit analysis indicate that the second largest 
shareholders have effective roles in compelling managers to distribute cash dividends. It can thus 
be contended that the second largest shareholders and the family shareholders may have a conflict 
of interests.  
This study also finds that there is a strong correlation between the size of the board and 
dividends, which justifies the importance of the board’s role in promoting better corporate 
governance practices supported by the effectiveness of control by dominant shareholders. 
Interestingly, the presence or the proportion of independent commissioners in the board of IDX 
firms has negative effects on dividends, which indicates that these board members are not effective 
enough to influence corporate dividend policies, probably due to the strong dominance of non-
independent commissioners who can be influenced the main shareholders. 
An appropriate ownership structure of listed Indonesian firms should be able to alleviate 
agency problems due to the increasing monitoring and control of incumbent managers by owners. 
In contrast, the dominance of a single large shareholder with the absence of a ‘balancing power’ 
from other shareholders may have negative impact on corporate governance mechanisms with 
undesirable outcomes such as the increasing vulnerability of minority shareholders to the risk of 
expropriation.  
Future research could use panel data to increase the number of firm-years as well as examine 
the ultimate ownership within the complex structures of IDX firms – such as pyramidal, cross-
holdings and other interlocking ownership.  
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Appendix  
 
Table A1.  
The definition of variables and expected association between dependent and explanatory variables 
Variable Definition Sign 
Payer Dummy variable: 1 if the firm paid dividends in the year; 0, otherwise. NA 
DPS The ratio of total dividends (in Indonesian Rupiah) to total number of shares. NA 
DIVTA The ratio of total dividends to total assets. NA 
DPR Dividend Payout Ratio: the ratio of  total dividends to net income.   NA  
Family ownership 1 Percentage of shares held by family members. - 
Family ownership 2 Dummy variable: 1 if family ownership is at least 10%; 0, otherwise. - 
Family ownership 3 Dummy variable: 1 if family ownership is at least 20%; 0, otherwise. - 
Controlling family  Dummy variable: 1 if the largest shareholder is a family member; 0, otherwise. - 
State ownership 1 Percentage of shares held by the State. + 
State ownership 2 Dummy variable: 1 if there is State ownership; 0, otherwise. + 
Controlling State Dummy variable: 1 if the largest shareholder is the State; 0, otherwise. + 
Agency conflict Inverse of the asset turnover: the ratio of assets to sales - 
Degree of concentration The sum of the proportion of the first and second largest shareholders. Higher 
values imply higher concentration. 
- 
High concentration Dummy variable: 1 if the degree of concentration is larger than the median 
value of the sample companies; 0, otherwise. 
- 
Second largest Percentage of shares held by the second largest shareholder. + 
First second  The difference between the percentage of shares held by the first and second 
largest shareholder. Higher values imply less competition in affecting the 
firm’s decision.  
- 
Foreign ownership 1 Percentage of shares held by foreign shareholders. + 
Foreign ownership 2 Dummy variable: 1 if there is foreign ownership; 0, otherwise. + 
Controlling foreign Dummy variable: 1 if the largest shareholder is a foreigner; 0, otherwise. + 
Board size The number of directors on the board.  + 
Board Independence The proportion of outside commissioners on the board. + 
Duality Dummy variable: 1 if the same person is the firm’s both CEO and Chairman; 
0, otherwise. 
+ 
Group affiliation Dummy variable: 1 if the firm is affiliated with a group of business; 0, 
otherwise.  
- 
Size 
  
The natural logarithm of deflated book value of total assets (in trillion 
Indonesian rupiahs, IDR10,223.16/USD).  
+ 
Price to book  Market value of equity divided by book value of equity.  - 
Growth The percentage change in the sales between 2012 and 2013. - 
Leverage Book value of total debt divided by total assets.  - 
Profitability  Return on assets (ROA): the ratio of net income to total assets. + 
Notes: 
*) The typical structure of a firm in Indonesia is that the board of director (consisting of president director/CEO, vice president director, 
and other member of directors) is under the supervision of the board of commissioners (consisting president of commissioner/ 
chairman, non-independent commissioners and independent commissioners). The independent commissioners (board independence) 
are appointed from professionals or persons who have no relationship with the shareholders’ interest. Meanwhile the position of non-
independent commissioners is commonly held by the main shareholders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
Table A2. Correlation matrix 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 
Payer (1) 1                           
DPS  (2) 0.743* 1                          
DIVTA (3) 0.477 0.642* 1                         
DPR (4) 0.728* 0.685* 0.577* 1                        
Family ownership 1 (5) 0.049 -0.047 -0.049 0.075 1                       
Family ownership 2 (6) 0.070 0.040 -0.033 0.130 0.807* 1                      
Family ownership 3 (7) 0.031 -0.010 -0.039 0.056 0.788* 0.671* 1                     
Controlling family (8) -0.005 -0.054 -0.063 0.004 0.717* 0.746* 0.600* 1                    
State ownership 1 (9) 0.138 0.223 0.140 0.115 -0.063 -0.067 -0.054 -0.061 1                   
State ownership 2 (10) 0.118 0.209 0.134 0.098 -0.066 -0.071 -0.057 -0.064 0.954* 1                  
Controlling State  (11) 0.155 0.244 0.157 0.126 -0.061 -0.066 -0.053 -0.060 0.985* 0.933* 1                 
Agency conflict (12) 0.178 0.196 0.189 0.128 0.053 0.035 0.013 0.027 -0.013 -0.022 -0.009 1                
Degree of concentration (13) 0.135 0.211 0.163 0.125 -0.158 -0.182 -0.185 -0.193 0.210 0.166 0.219 0.082 1               
High concentration (14) 0.047 0.074 0.109 0.089 -0.037 -0.067 -0.062 -0.087 0.087 0.040 0.071 0.082 0.611* 1              
Second largest (15) 0.107 0.198 0.126 0.071 -0.127 -0.132 -0.125 -0.179 0.130 0.116 0.155 -0.046 0.494 -0.048 1             
First second (16) 0.144 0.151 0.131 0.124 -0.076 -0.105 -0.085 -0.054 0.213 0.183 0.212 0.135 0.721* 0.555* -0.141 1            
Foreign ownership1 (17) 0.003 0.049 0.044 0.068 -0.074 -0.058 -0.011 -0.167 -0.147 -0.127 -0.146 0.117 0.074 0.186 -0.025 0.022 1           
Foreign ownership 2  (18) -0.014 -0.027 -0.034 0.019 -0.036 -0.056 -0.003 -0.169 -0.168 -0.149 -0.161 0.048 -0.129 0.001 -0.040 -0.189 0.783* 1          
Controlling foreign  (19) 0.027 0.094 0.079 0.112 -0.051 -0.038 0.013 -0.133 -0.096 -0.068 -0.098 0.111 0.144 0.228 -0.048 0.140 0.825* 0.512* 1         
Board size (20) 0.339 0.396 0.215 0.235 -0.067 -0.078 -0.026 -0.095 0.158 0.153 0.160 -0.010 0.173 0.080 0.169 0.106 0.087 0.053 0.095 1        
Board independence (21) -0.101 -0.094 -0.037 -0.058 -0.051 -0.022 -0.040 -0.075 -0.030 -0.029 -0.032 -0.048 -0.020 0.034 -0.027 -0.012 -0.038 0.029 -0.041 -0.046 1       
Duality (22) 0.003 -0.051 -0.051 -0.004 0.287 0.194 0.251 0.304 -0.029 -0.030 -0.028 0.070 0.005 -0.038 0.038 0.029 -0.097 -0.124 -0.063 -0.070 0.030 1      
Group affiliation (23) 0.052 0.043 0.039 0.047 -0.001 0.019 0.015 0.017 0.112 0.087 0.113 -0.172 -0.012 -0.036 0.007 0.006 -0.156 -0.128 -0.122 0.124 -0.054 0.073 1     
Size (24) 0.244 0.308 0.110 0.138 -0.188 -0.181 -0.145 -0.179 0.245 0.230 0.256 -0.184 0.107 -0.084 0.192 0.040 -0.007 0.017 -0.013 0.555 0.028 -0.041 0.214 1    
Price to book  (25) 0.199 0.159 0.278 0.127 0.218 0.111 0.170 0.138 0.022 0.019 0.030 0.099 -0.002 -0.027 0.024 0.024 -0.040 -0.010 -0.030 0.072 0.042 0.012 -0.045 0.038 1   
Growth (26) -0.030 -0.025 -0.048 -0.046 0.028 -0.022 0.013 -0.015 0.028 0.030 0.027 -0.105 -0.058 -0.106 -0.020 -0.050 -0.097 -0.062 -0.088 0.126 -0.057 -0.029 0.111 0.174 0.023 1  
Leverage (27) -0.146 -0.141 -0.133 -0.065 -0.045 -0.086 -0.068 -0.052 0.016 0.026 0.012 0.197 -0.087 -0.077 -0.066 -0.037 -0.012 0.000 -0.009 -0.005 0.030 -0.011 0.011 0.092 -0.023 -0.062 1 
Profitability (28) 0.426 0.454 0.541* 0.223 0.015 0.045 0.032 0.023 0.095 0.096 0.108 0.148 0.089 0.029 0.086 0.070 -0.022 -0.025 0.011 0.237 -0.042 -0.031 0.012 0.144 0.240 0.159 -0.356 
Notes: 
See Table A1 for the definition of the variables. As expected, the correlation coefficients among the alternative proxies for the same variable are high. The bold and asterisked numbers are those having coefficient correlation above 0.5. The unreported variance inflation 
factor (VIF) figures regarding the explanatory variables in the regression models are below the threshold of 10, which confirms the absence of the multicollinearity problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Minimum      Maximum   Mean          S.D. 
Payer 0.000 1.000 0.469 0.501 
DPS  0.000 817.000 28.322 80.747 
DIVTA 0.000 0.940 0.016 0.059 
DPR 0.000 0.871 0.134 0.195 
Family ownership 1 0.000 0.950 0.036 0.119 
Family ownership 2 0.000 1.000 0.102 0.303 
Family ownership 3 0.000 1.000 0.055 0.229 
Controlling family 0.000 1.000 0.076 0.255 
State ownership 1 0.000 0.900 0.029 0.135 
State ownership 2 0.000 1.000 0.047 0.211 
Controlling State  0.000 1.000 0.041 0.205 
Agency conflict 0.547 6.816 2.307 2.001 
Degree of concentration 0.140 0.995 0.606 0.201 
High concentration 0.000 1.000 0.485 0.500 
Second largest 0.000 0.490 0.175 0.115 
First second 0.000 0.850 0.225 0.235 
Foreign ownership1 0.000 0.960 0.193 0.275 
Foreign ownership 2  0.000 1.000 0.445 0.498 
Controlling foreign  0.000 1.000 0.176 0.375 
Board size 1.000 14.000 3.811 2.016 
Board independence 0.000 1.000 0.408 0.148 
Duality 0.000 1.000 0.016 0.131 
Group affiliation 0.000 1.000 0.768 0.414 
Size 9.380 18.670 14.502 1.696 
Price to book  0.090 11.270 1.979 1.905 
Growth -0.460 2.163 0.204 0.451 
Leverage 0.040 0.990 0.473 0.214 
Profitability -1.530 0.391 0.037 0.109 
Notes: 
This table reports descriptive statistics of the 369 firms. DPS is in Indonesian Rupiah (IDR). The 
average exchange rate in January 2014 was IDR10,223.16/USD (Source: Central Bank of 
Indonesia). See Table A1 for the definition of the variables. 
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Table 2. The ranges of share ownership held by the largest shareholders for                
Indonesian firms in 2013. 
Range of Ownership (%) Firms Percentage 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
90-100  7 1.90 1.90 
80-89.99 20 5.42 7.32 
70-79.99 28 7.59 14.91 
60-69.99 46 12.47 27.38 
50-59.99 52 14.09 41.47 
40-49.99 60 16.26 57.73 
30-39.99 63 17.07 74.80 
20-29.99 53 14.36 89.16 
10-19.99 34 9.21 98.37 
0-9.99  6 1.63 100.00 
 Total 369  100  
Notes:  
The largest shareholder is defined as the shareholder who has the firm’s highest proportion of stocks in 
terms of the number of shares held. The first column shows range of ownership held by the largest 
shareholders. For the range between 90-100%, this means there are 7 firms in which its largest 
shareholder has at least 90% of stocks. Similarly, for the last line, there are 6 firms in which the largest 
shareholder holds less than 10% of stocks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3. The number of firms and the overview of dividend policy in each industry classification. 
Industry 
Payer 
Non- 
Payer 
Number of 
firms 
Proportion of 
firms 
Proportion of 
payers (%) 
Mean DPS for 
payers (IDR)  
Agriculture 10 5 15 4.07 66.67 42.26 
Mining 13 23 36 9.76 36.11 58.51 
Basic Industry 25 33 58 15.72 43.10 105.74 
Miscellaneous Industry 17 21 38 10.30 44.74 95.01 
Consumer Goods 17 14 31 8.40 54.84 137.58 
Property &Real Estate 27 24 51 13.82 52.94 21.01 
Infrastructure 17 25 42 11.38 40.48 53.14 
Trade &Service  47 51 98 26.56 47.96 32.02 
Total  173 196 369 100.00    
    Notes: 
   This table exhibits the number of payer and non-payer firms for each industry. The Financial Service Authority classifies IDX firms 
into nine different industries; financial industry is excluded as sample of this study. Payers account for 47% of sample compared 
to 53% of non-payers. Last column shows mean of dividend per share in Indonesian rupiah, and firms in  consumers goods industry.  
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Table 4. Probit regressions for the propensity to pay dividends.  
 
Panel A. Managers-shareholders conflict              Panel B. Major-minor shareholders conflict   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Family ownership 1 0.255 - - - 0.110 - - - 
  (0.339)    (0.283)    
Family ownership 2 - 0.156 - - - 0.109 - - 
   (0.106)    (0.102)   
Family ownership 3 - - 0.0879 - - - 0.013 - 
    (0.143)    (0.130)  
Controlling family  - - - 0.0067 - - - 0.007 
     (0.130)    (0.120) 
State ownership 1 0.124 - - - 0.389 - - - 
  (0.274)    (0.271)    
State ownership 2 - 0.038 - - - 0.207 - - 
   (0.150)    (0.132)   
Controlling State - - 0.129 0.129 - - 0.304** 0.293** 
    (0.176) (0.176)   (0.140) (0.146) 
Agency conflict -0.087*** -0.088*** -0.0884*** -0.0876*** - - - - 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.0218) (0.0216)     
Degree of concentration - - - - 0.075 - - - 
      (0.121)    
High concentration - - - - - -0.006 - - 
       (0.0607)   
Second largest - - - - - - 0.175 - 
        (0.246)  
First second  - - - - - - - 0.063 
         (0.110) 
Foreign ownership 1 -0.049 - - - -0.001 - - - 
  (0.123)    (0.107)    
Foreign ownership 2 - -0.041 - - - -0.004 - - 
   (0.069)    (0.059)   
Controlling Foreign - - -0.0335 -0.0290 - - 0.040 0.035 
    (0.0857) (0.0872)   (0.076) (0.079) 
Board size 0.054*** 0.053** 0.0530** 0.0548*** 0.071*** 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.0208) (0.0210) (0.0183) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Board independence -0.331 -0.332 -0.339 -0.341 -0.080 -0.088 -0.076 -0.074 
  (0.255) (0.260) (0.255) (0.256) (0.216) (0.216) (0.216) (0.216) 
Duality -0.040 -0.064 -0.0103 0.0198 0.113 0.088 0.136 0.139 
  (0.253) (0.251) (0.247) (0.247) (0.222) (0.227) (0.224) (0.221) 
Group affiliation 0.073 0.0691 0.0734 0.0746 0.070 0.068 0.073 0.070 
  (0.083) (0.083) (0.0837) (0.0835) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073) 
Size  0.064** 0.068*** 0.0621** 0.0586** 0.037* 0.041** 0.033* 0.036* 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.0262) (0.0261) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
Price to book  0.051*** 0.052*** 0.0534*** 0.0555*** 0.035** 0.034** 0.0355** 0.035** 
  (0.020) (0.019) (0.0193) (0.0187) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Growth -0.264* -0.259* -0.255* -0.250* -0.351*** -0.359*** -0.340*** -0.343*** 
  (0.137) (0.135) (0.135) (0.132) (0.124) (0.128) (0.121) (0.122) 
Leverage -0.484* -0.476* -0.482* -0.482* -0.226 -0.239 -0.225 -0.234 
  (0.256) (0.254) (0.254) (0.251) (0.153) (0.154) (0.155) (0.151) 
Profitability  3.135*** 3.144*** 3.132*** 3.104*** 2.257*** 2.286*** 2.309*** 2.258*** 
  (1.05) (1.044) (1.061) (1.031) (0.695) (0.702) (0.703) (0.690) 
          
Wald χ2 106.62  105.50 106.15                                                106.57 88.73 90.53 87.75 87.49 
Pseudo R2 0.3208 0.3239 0.3206                  0.3198 0.2255 0.2253 0.2278 0.2276 
Prob>χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes.  
This table shows the results of marginal effect regressions for the tendency to pay dividends from the data consisting 369 firms, where the dependent 
variable is Payer. Panel A reports the probit coefficients in the context of managers-shareholders conflicts of interest; Panel B reports the probit 
coefficients in the context of major-minor shareholders conflict of interest. In Panel A, Agency conflict variable is based on the asset turnover ratio 
while in Panel B it is based on Degree of concentration, High concentration, Second largest and First second. In Panel B, none of the proxies for 
the conflicts is significant, but in Panel A Agency conflict reveals highly significant results. Board size is the only significant variable of corporate 
governance related factors. Regarding firm-specific controlling variables, Panel A shows that all the variables are significant while Panel B shows 
that Leverage is the only insignificant variable. Robust heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in the parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; 
*** p<0.01. Industry dummies are included in all models. See Table A1 for the definition of the variables. 
 
 
     
 
Table 5. OLS regressions for the level of dividend payment: managers and shareholders conflicts of interest 
  Panel A. Dependent variable: DPS Panel B. Dependent variable: DIVTA Panel C. Dependent variable: DPR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Family ownership 1 -0.328 - - - -0.024** - - - 0.114 - - - 
 (0.322)    (0.009)    (0.129)    
Family ownership 2  - 0.143 - - - -0.0057* - - - 0.085* - - 
  (0.144)    (0.0034)    (0.050)   
Family ownership 3 - - -0.026 - - - -0.009** - - - 0.032 - 
   (0.174)    (0.004)    (0.052)  
Controlling family - - - -0.047 - - - -0.0072* - - - 0.016 
    (0.164)    (0.0040)    (0.046) 
State ownership 1 0.681** - - - 0.015 - - - 0.110 - - - 
 (0.341)    (0.009)    (0.0714)    
State ownership 2 - 0.351* - - - 0.0081 - - - 0.049 - - 
  (0.191)    (0.0054)    (0.039)   
Controlling State   - - 0.498** 0.496** - - 0.011* 0.0109* - - 0.073* 0.074* 
   (0.199) (0.199)   (0.006) (0.006)   (0.041) (0.041) 
Agency conflict -0.063*** -0.065*** -0.061*** -0.062*** -0.0008 -0.0008* -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.0117*** -0.011** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Foreign ownership 1 0.046 - - - 0.0045 - - - 0.036 - - - 
 (0.153)    (0.0049)    (0.039)    
Foreign ownership 2 - -0.060 - - - -0.0007 - - - 0.004 - - 
  (0.076)    (0.0025)    (0.020)   
Controlling foreign   - - 0.100 0.095 - - 0.003 0.0028 - - 0.034 0.036 
   (0.111) (0.111)   (0.003) (0.0032)   (0.027) (0.028) 
Board size 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.0014** 0.0014** 0.0014** 0.0013** 0.014** 0.015** 0.014** 0.014** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Board independence -0.387 -0.364 -0.360 -0.367 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.028 -0.034 -0.028 -0.028 
 (0.236) (0.245) (0.235) (0.237) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.080) (0.081) (0.080) (0.081) 
Duality -0.195 -0.359 -0.245 -0.229 -0.003 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 -0.028 -0.041 -0.018 -0.013 
 (0.292) (0.314) (0.303) (0.305) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.068) (0.074) (0.072) (0.074) 
Group affiliation 0.079 0.064 0.078 0.078 0.0059** 0.005** 0.0057** 0.0056** 0.028 0.024 0.028 0.028 
 (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.0028) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Size  0.073*** 0.084*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.003 0.0051 0.002 0.002 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Price to Book 0.033* 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.0028*** 0.0026*** 0.0027*** 0.0026*** 0.008* 0.008* 0.009* 0.009* 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Growth -0.246** -0.266*** -0.247** -0.247** -0.0107** -0.0117** -0.011** -0.011** -0.036 -0.036 -0.033 -0.033 
 (0.096) (0.102) (0.098) (0.097) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.004) (0.004) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) 
Leverage -0.334 -0.327 -0.325 -0.324 0.0012 0.0007 0.0012 0.0016 -0.063 -0.060 -0.064 -0.066 
 (0.218) (0.218) (0.215) (0.216) (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.010) (0.0104) (0.041) (0.042) (0.040) (0.040) 
Profitability 3.392*** 3.373*** 3.374*** 3.379*** 0.156*** 0.157*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.256* 0.241* 0.246* 0.245* 
 (0.784) (0.790) (0.780) (0.780) (0.044) (0.046) (0.044) (0.045) (0.135) (0.139) (0.131) (0.127) 
Constant -0.676** -0.816** -0.705** -0.692** -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 0.030 0.0055 0.050 0.055 
 (0.343) (0.342) (0.344) (0.344) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.094) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) 
             
R-squared 0.412 0.413 0.415 0.415 0.420 0.413 0.420 0.418 0.180 0.189 0.181 0.180 
F (Prob>F) 13.98*** 13.41*** 14.20*** 14.16*** 5.89*** 5.91*** 5.97*** 5.99*** 5.75*** 5.65*** 5.90*** 5.96*** 
Notes. This table shows the results of OLS regressions for the level of dividend payments from data consisting 369 firms. The analyses consider the manager-shareholder conflicts. Robust heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors are in the parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Industry dummies are included in all models. See Table A1 for the definition of the variables. 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. OLS regressions for the level of dividend payments: major-minor shareholders conflicts of interest 
 Panel A. Dependent variable: DPS Panel B. Dependent variable: DIVTA Panel C. Dependent variable: DPR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Family ownership 1 -1.034 - - - -0.037*** - - - 0.044 - - - 
  (0.665)    (0.012)    (0.113)    
Family ownership 2 - 0.168 - - - -0.011*** - -  - 0.057 - -    
   (0.333)    (0.004)    (0.048)   
Family ownership 3 - - -0.161 - - - -0.013*** - - - 0.008    - 
    (0.390)    (0.005)    (0.053)  
Controlling family  - - - -0.173 - - - -0.011** - - - 0.00003 
     (0.345)    (0.004)    (0.043) 
State ownership 1 2.023*** - - - 0.0188* - - - 0.144** - - - 
  (0.763)    (0.010)    (0.063)    
State ownership 2 - 1.203*** - - - 0.0105* - - - 0.077** - - 
   (0.440)    (0.005)    (0.036)   
Controlling State - - 1.464*** 1.539*** - - 0.0134** 0.014**   0.105*** 0.099** 
    (0.436) (0.445)   (0.005) (0.006)   (0.036) (0.039) 
Degree of Concentration  0.430 - - - 0.0007 - - - 0.0492 - - - 
  (0.316)    (0.005)    (0.043)    
High concentration - 0.026 - - - -0.0002 - -  0.007  - - 
   (0.171)    (0.002)    (0.019)   
Second largest - - 1.364* - - - 0.006 - - - -0.009 - 
    (0.717)    (0.012)    (0.061)  
First second  - - - 0.119 - - - -0.0009 - -  - 0.0175 
     (0.329)    (0.006)    (0.039) 
Foreign ownership 1 -0.0280 - - - 0.002 - - - 0.027 - - - 
  (0.330)    (0.006)    (0.040)    
Foreign ownership 2 - -0.126 - - - -0.0004 - - - 0.008 -  - 
   (0.168)    (0.003)    (0.020)   
Controlling foreign - - 0.233 0.195 - - 0.005 0.004   - - 0.047 0.045 
    (0.248) (0.252)   (0.004) (0.005)   (0.030) (0.031) 
Board size 0.215*** 0.222*** 0.208*** 0.215*** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.013** 0.014** 0.013** 0.013** 
  (0.052) (0.052) (0.0504) (0.051) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Board independence -0.561 -0.514 -0.507 -0.510 -0.001 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0012 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.001 
  (0.516) (0.516) (0.503) (0.510) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.0109) (0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) 
Duality -0.205 -0.537 -0.382 -0.282 -0.003 -0.008 -0.005 -0.0051 0.008 -0.008 0.014 0.016 
  (0.612) (0.666) (0.620) (0.653) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.069) (0.074) (0.075) (0.075) 
Group affiliation 0.106 0.080 0.112 0.092 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.025 0.021 0.024 0.024 
  (0.228) (0.230) (0.228) (0.228) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
Size 0.117** 0.141** 0.110** 0.124** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 
  (0.054) (0.058) (0.054) (0.0557) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Price to book  0.0891** 0.081* 0.0822** 0.081** 0.0029*** 0.0029*** 0.0029*** 0.0028*** 0.0102** 0.009* 0.0101** 0.010** 
  (0.040) (0.041) (0.0405) (0.040) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
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Table 6 (continued). 
Growth -0.803*** -0.857*** -0.803*** -0.831*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.066*** -0.064*** -0.063** -0.063** 
  (0.183) (0.213) (0.192) (0.196) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
Leverage -0.484 -0.499 -0.441 -0.496 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.045 -0.046 -0.050 -0.050 
  (0.366) (0.367) (0.373) (0.369) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Profitability  6.784*** 6.731*** 6.827*** 6.749*** 0.161*** 0.160*** 0.158*** 0.159*** 0.296** 0.294** 0.302** 0.296** 
  (1.506) (1.510) (1.502) (1.498) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.128) (0.130) (0.128) (0.126) 
Constant -1.673** -1.725** -1.613** -1.548** 0.013 0.012 0.010 0.011 -0.016 -0.005 0.029 0.024 
 (0.776) (0.779) (0.727) (0.753) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.094) (0.093) (0.087) (0.090) 
             
R2 0.345 0.338 0.352 0.345 0.288 0.283 0.288 0.285 0.129 0.130 0.133 0.134 
F (Prob>F) 10.11*** 10.7*** 11.10*** 10.82*** 4.65*** 4.93*** 5.02*** 4.91*** 4.52*** 4.54*** 5.02*** 4.99*** 
Notes. This table shows the results of the OLS estimations regarding the determining factors for the amount of dividend payments using data consisting 369 firms. The analyses consider the conflicts between small and large shareholders. Robust 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in the parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Industry dummies are included in all models. See Table A1 for the definition of the variables. 
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Table 7. Heckman regressions for the level of dividend payments: managers and shareholders conflict of interest 
  Panel A. Dependent variable: DPS Panel B. Dependent variable: DIVTA Panel C. Dependent variable: DPR 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Family ownership 1 0.900 - - - 1.172 - - - 0.552 - - - 
  (0.809)    (0.808)    (0.793)    
Family ownership 2 - 0.441 - - - 0.512* - - - 0.280 - - 
   (0.281)    (0.276)    (0.286)   
Family ownership 3 - - 0.266 - - - 0.426 - - - 0.118 - 
    (0.357)    (0.359)    (0.357)   
Controlling family  - - - 0.0284 - - - 0.101 - - - -0.113 
     (0.313)    (0.307)    (0.313) 
State ownership 1 0.368 - - - 0.161 - - - 0.334 - - - 
  (0.736)    (0.740)    (0.722)    
State ownership 2 - 0.148 - - - 0.0315 - - - 0.113 - - 
   (0.427)    (0.431)    (0.421)   
Controlling State - - 0.391 0.390 - - 0.257 0.251 - - 0.358 0.343 
   - (0.492) (0.492)   (0.493) (0.493)   (0.483) (0.483) 
 Agency conflict -0.158*** -0.153*** -0.157*** -0.157*** -0.163*** -0.160*** -0.164*** -0.163*** -0.164*** -0.161*** -0.164*** -0.165*** 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.0404) (0.0397) (0.0407) (0.0406) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) 
Foreign ownership 1 -0.237 - - - -0.305 - - - -0.251 - - - 
 (0.311) -   (0.310)    (0.311)    
Foreign ownership 2 - -0.097 - - - -0.138 - - - -0.121 - - 
  (0.168)    (0.168)    (0.166)   
Controlling foreign   - - -0.127 -0.110 - - -0.180 -0.158 - - -0.124 -0.133 
  - (0.219) (0.220)   (0.221) (0.221)   (0.218) (0.220) 
Board size 0.139** 0.133** 0.136** 0.140** 0.132** 0.129** 0.129** 0.134** 0.136** 0.134** 0.134** 0.136** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.0550) (0.0548) (0.0552) (0.0547) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Board independence -0.867 -0.907 -0.880 -0.885 -0.974* -0.995* -0.973* -0.988* -0.971* -0.962* -0.984* -1.014* 
 (0.578) (0.576) (0.578) (0.579) (0.577) (0.572) (0.578) (0.579) (0.581) (0.576) (0.580) (0.582) 
Duality -0.198 -0.164 -0.075 0.0175 -0.317 -0.277 -0.182 -0.0640 -0.132 -0.135 -0.0281 0.0835 
 (0.571) (0.555) (0.547) (0.553) (0.580) (0.551) (0.550) (0.553) (0.566) (0.554) (0.548) (0.556) 
Group affiliation 0.186 0.186 0.193 0.193 0.184 0.184 0.191 0.190 0.197 0.203 0.213 0.215 
 (0.200) (0.199) (0.198) (0.198) (0.199) (0.198) (0.197) (0.197) (0.199) (0.197) (0.197) (0.197) 
Size  0.175*** 0.185*** 0.163** 0.154** 0.188*** 0.196*** 0.177*** 0.165** 0.178*** 0.183*** 0.166** 0.159** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.0670) (0.0667) (0.0670) (0.0657) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) 
Price to Book 0.113*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.124*** 0.115*** 0.122*** 0.120*** 0.128*** 0.129*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.140*** 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.0389) (0.0404) (0.0393) (0.0397) (0.0396) (0.040) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) 
Growth -0.781** -0.730* -0.736* -0.711* -0.749** -0.700* -0.708* -0.665* -0.859** -0.860** -0.826** -0.820** 
 (0.385) (0.375) (0.377) (0.372) (0.374) (0.364) (0.366) (0.359) (0.395) (0.397) (0.390) (0.388) 
Leverage -0.961** -0.921** -0.943** -0.943** -1.048** -1.001** -1.030** -1.034** -1.057** -0.999** -1.028** -1.040** 
 (0.429) (0.424) (0.428) (0.427) (0.430) (0.424) (0.430) (0.429) (0.436) (0.431) (0.432) (0.432) 
Profitability 8.508*** 8.601*** 8.481*** 8.359*** 8.807*** 8.862*** 8.719*** 8.576*** 8.871*** 8.928*** 8.836*** 8.791*** 
 (1.550) (1.543) (1.547) (1.528) (1.513) (1.497) (1.514) (1.487) (1.586) (1.573) (1.577) (1.563) 
Constant -2.553*** -2.724*** -2.417*** -2.312*** -2.631*** -2.776*** -2.507*** -2.358*** -2.505*** -2.617*** -2.378*** -2.256*** 
 (0.834) (0.824) (0.818) (0.819) (0.837) (0.829) (0.823) (0.821) (0.832) (0.819) (0.819) (0.822) 
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Table 7 (continued). 
Wald χ2 55.48 47.91 53.61 53.38 111.49 108.10 113.5 107.88 31.85 30.94 34.27 34.49 
Mills Lambda (Coefficient) -0.109 -0.233 -0.125 -0.128 -0.013 - 0.014 -0.102  -0.013  0.072  0.083 0.071  0.076 
Prob Mills Lambda > χ2  0.607 0.342 0.559 0.566 0.064  0.035 0.092 0.102  0.126 0. 135                             0.117 0.084 
Notes. This table shows the results of Heckman regressions for the level of dividend payments using data consisting 369 firms. The analyses consider the manager-shareholder conflicts.  Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C use different dependent variables; they 
are DPS, DIVTA and DPR, respectively. Each panel has four model specification based on selected independent variables. Robust heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in the parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Industry dummies are 
included in all models. See Table A1 for the definition of the variables. 
54 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Heckman regressions for the level of dividend payments: Major-minor shareholders conflicts of interest                   
 Panel A. Dependent variable: DPS Panel B. Dependent variable: DIVTA Panel C. Dependent variable: DPR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Family ownership 1 -0.322 - - - -0.0747** - - - 0.256 - - -  
(0.728)    (0.0295)    (0.712)    
Family ownership 2  0.232 - - - -0.0152 - - - 0.273 - - 
  (0.261)    (0.0102)    (0.262)   
Family ownership 3 - - -0.137 - - - -0.0313*** - - - 0.0198   
  (0.335)    (0.0116)    (0.330)  
Controlling family  - - - -0.0816 - - - -0.0265** - - - 0.0219  
   (0.298)    (0.0121)    (0.293) 
State ownership 1 1.159* - - - 0.0366 - - - 0.890 - - -  
(0.703)    (0.0228)    (0.692)    
State ownership 2  0.625 - - - 0.0191 - - - 0.424    
 (0.400)    (0.0128)    (0.399)   
Controlling State - - 0.913* 0.932** - - 0.0211 0.0266* - - 0.779* 0.704  
  (0.469) (0.473)   (0.0131) (0.0154)   (0.463) (0.471) 
Degree of concentration 0.116 - - - 0.0046 - - - 0.300 - - - 
 (0.317)    (0.0116)    (0.374)    
High concentration  -0.0019 - - - 0.0003 - - - 0.108 - - 
  (0.156)    (0.0054)    (0.155)   
Second largest - - 0.728 - - - 0.0222 - - - 0.109 - 
   (0.660)    (0.0212)    (0.532)  
First second  - - - 0.0180 - - - -0.0062 - - - 0.233 
    (0.285)    (0.0096)    (0.282) 
Foreign ownership 1 0.0392 - - - 0.0072 - - - 0.0329 - - - 
 (0.289)    (0.0110)    (0.296)    
Foreign ownership 2  0.0142 - - - 0.00119 - - - -0.0199 - - 
  (0.153)    (0.00579)    (0.154)   
Controlling foreign - - 0.231 0.215 - - 0.0115 0.0102 - - 0.198 0.178 
   (0.203) (0.206)   (0.0073) (0.0083)   (0.205) (0.208) 
Board size 0.141*** 0.142*** 0.136*** 0.139*** 0.0031 0.0025 0.0013 0.0031 0.179*** 0.180*** 0.181*** 0.180***  
(0.0489) (0.0489) (0.0488) (0.0485) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0514) (0.0513) (0.0510) (0.0509) 
Board independence -0.526 -0.544 -0.491 -0.499 -0.0106 -0.0087 -0.0039 -0.0126 -0.498 -0.516 -0.468 -0.461  
(0.494) (0.494) (0.494) (0.495) (0.0210) (0.0207) (0.0196) (0.0217) (0.492) (0.490) (0.490) (0.491) 
Duality 0.477 0.300 0.470 0.491 0.0340 0.0072 0.0179 0.0187 0.281 0.198 0.345 0.324  
(0.563) (0.559) (0.557) (0.568) (0.0250) (0.0220) (0.0216) (0.0240) (0.577) (0.570) (0.561) (0.575) 
Group affiliation 0.208 0.203 0.224 0.210 0.0016 -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0003 0.228 0.217 0.230 0.227 
 (0.184) (0.183) (0.184) (0.183) (0.0078) (0.0075) (0.0072) (0.0079) (0.185) (0.184) (0.184) (0.184) 
Size 0.128** 0.149** 0.120** 0.130** -0.0038 -0.0034 -0.0039 -0.0031 0.103* 0.113* 0.0889 0.0945 
 (0.0588) (0.0595) (0.0587) (0.0586) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0591) (0.0590) (0.0585) (0.0580) 
Price to book  0.0674* 0.0624* 0.0670* 0.0653* 0.0059*** 0.0047*** 0.0047*** 0.0055*** 0.0736** 0.0719** 0.0732** 0.0738** 
 (0.0351) (0.0344) (0.0350) (0.0346) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0350) (0.0345) (0.0348) (0.0345) 
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Table 8 (continued). 
Growth -0.831** -0.897*** -0.825** -0.855*** -0.0487** -0.0468** -0.0382** -0.0519** -0.931*** -0.926*** -0.904*** -0.902***  
(0.329) (0.331) (0.328) (0.327) (0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0187) (0.0209) (0.322) (0.319) (0.317) (0.315) 
Leverage -0.574* -0.597* -0.548 -0.582* -0.0118 -0.0069 -0.0039 -0.0120 -0.620* -0.633* -0.632* -0.639*  
(0.349) (0.348) (0.348) (0.346) (0.0198) (0.0194) (0.0179) (0.0203) (0.345) (0.345) (0.345) (0.343) 
Profitability 6.548*** 6.566*** 6.649*** 6.605*** 0.358*** 0.353*** 0.340*** 0.373*** 6.379*** 6.411*** 6.539*** 6.391***  
(1.197) (1.197) (1.193) (1.205) (0.0738) (0.0722) (0.0644) (0.0765) (1.195) (1.192) (1.194) (1.200) 
Constant -2.733*** -2.934*** -2.735*** -2.702*** 0.0209 0.0256 0.0408 0.0122 -0.156 -2.528*** -2.204*** -2.322***  
(0.812) (0.801) (0.770) (0.787) (0.0585) (0.0593) (0.0511) (0.0588) (0.478) (0.790) (0.760) (0.780) 
             
Wald χ2 37.92 36.18 38.74 36.69 70.70 74.38 78.09 71.83 15.67 19.63 20.39 19.18 
Mills Lambda (Coefficient) 0.0633 -0.409 -0.585 -0.0827 0.0340 0.0276 0.0187 0.0375 0.299 0.275 0.266 0.276 
Prob Mills Lambda > χ2  0.904 0.796 0.921 0.985 0.144 0.209 0.176 0.140 0.118 0.113 0.107 0.106 
Notes. This table presents the results of Heckman regression for the level of dividend payments from data consisting 369 firms. The analyses consider the conflicts between small and large shareholders. Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C use different dependent 
variables; they are DPS, DIVTA and DPR, respectively. Each panel has four model specification based on selected independent variables. Robust heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in the parentheses. * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Industry 
dummies are included in all models. See Table A1 for the definition of the variables. 
